In landlord’s post-discharge suit for rent against debtor, magistrate court ruled that debtor had not met his burden of proving affirmative defense of bankruptcy discharge and entered judgment in favor of landlord. In action for discharge violation, Bankruptcy Court concluded that action was a suit on pre-petition lease and violated the discharge injunction. The Court ruled that bankruptcy was not an affirmative defense under section 524(a). With regard to the preclusive effect of the magistrate court judgment, the court ruled that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the discharge injunction existed prior to the state court judgment and that a state court judgment determining whether a debt is discharged is not entitled to preclusive effect under section 524(a) if it is based on inadequate facts or misconstrues the effect of the discharge as a matter of law. Consequently, the Court determined that the judgment was void. In the circumstances of the case, the Court declined to award sanctions.
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Opinions
Effective January 1, 2017, Orders in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia designated by the Court as "opinions" will be transmitted to the Government Publishing Office (GPO) and made available to the public at no cost. To view these opinions, click HERE to be transferred to GPO site.
Orders designated as Opinions and issued between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2016 are maintained on this website. Many of these Opinions are not intended for publication and are so designated. Each entry includes the style of the matter, the case number, the date entered on the docket, and a short parenthetical expression of the issue(s) raised. The most recent opinions appear first.
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Honorable Paul W. Bonapfel
Order denying motion for default judgment. Plaintiff fails to set forth factual or legal basis for judgment on 523(a)(2) claim since it erroneously relies on implied representation theory and fails to make allegations from which, if true, court could draw an inference of the Debtor’s actual, subjective fraudulent intent.
Based on stipulated record in lieu of trial, court determined that the only claims for damages remaining for trial in Fulton County State Court, after remand from Georgia Court of Appeals, are claim for value of the address book, customer list and telephone number belonging to Plaintiff that Debtor used in new business after resignation and claims for usurpation of corporate opportunities prior to resignation. But the court concluded that only the claim for value of the address book, customer and list telephone number was excepted from discharge pursuant to section 523(a)(6) and that the Plaintiff had no other claims against the debtor excepted from discharge under sections 523(a)(2), (4), or (6).
Order denying motion for default judgment in part based upon death of defendant. Capacity to be sued is determined by law of the party’s domicile (Rule 17(b)(1)). Because Georgia law provides that proceedings held after the death of an individual are void without substitution of proper representative party and because no substitution had been made, court could not adjudicate matter with respect to deceased defendant.
(denying debtors' motion to vacate discharge for the purpose of executing a reaffirmation agreement).
(granting creditor's motion for relief from the stay and to validate foreclosure sale, as debtor had no interest in the property, the property was not property of the debtor's estate, since it was owned by a separate limited liability company at the time of the foreclosure, and the co-debtor stay did not prohibit the postpetition foreclosure of the property).
(denying motion for summary judgment as to whether claim is nondischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(4) due to defalcation by the debtor in his fiduciary capacity to building materials supplier under Michigan's builder's trust law).
Honorable Mary Grace Diehl (Recall)
Trial order granting Defendants’ Motion for Involuntary Dismissal, dismissing Plaintiffs’ 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(6) and 523(a)(19) nondischargeability claims. Georgia’s Disabled Adults and Elder Persons Protection Act, as Plaintiff’s intentional tort theory of recovery under § 523(a)(6), was determined to be inapplicable. Similarly, § 523(a)(19) was inapplicable because there was no evidence of any misrepresentation by Defendants and the Note in question did not qualify as a security under Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
Judge James E. Massey (Retired)
Debtor’s objection seeking disallowance of proof of an unsecured claim arising from an equity security was construed as seeking subordination of the claim under section 510. The Court subordinated the claim but held that the fact that the claim was based on a security did not negate that it was in fact a claim and could not be disallowed under section 502 merely because it was “based on an equity investment.”
Judge Joyce Bihary (Retired)
(§ 364. Debtor, not debtor's owners, must bring the motion to obtain credit.)