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Opinions

Effective January 1, 2017, Orders in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia designated by the Court as "opinions" will be transmitted to the Government Publishing Office (GPO) and made available to the public at no cost.  To view these opinions, click HERE to be transferred to GPO site.

Orders designated as Opinions and issued between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2016 are maintained on this website. Many of these Opinions are not intended for publication and are so designated. Each entry includes the style of the matter, the case number, the date entered on the docket, and a short parenthetical expression of the issue(s) raised. The most recent opinions appear first.

You can narrow your search by judge and/or year below.  You can also use the search feature above to search by name, word, or phrase. The single opinions are in PDF text format and may be searched for word, phrase, or date by using “Control F,” the Windows search function available in any Windows application.

(Order denying Hope's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; pleading 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2); collateral estoppel does not preclude bankruptcy court from exercising exclusive jurisdiction to determine nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)); signed July 11, 2014, entered July 14, 2014 (Doc. No. 15).
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

(Order denying Hope's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; pleading 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2); collateral estoppel does not preclude bankruptcy court from exercising exclusive jurisdiction to determine nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)); signed July 11, 2014, entered July 14, 2014 (Doc. No. 15).
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

(Order granting Motion to Dismiss and denying Motion to Strike; pleading recovery of money/property under FRBP 7001(1), objection to discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(c), and nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(14)); signed July 11, 2014, entered July 14, 2014 (Doc. No. 13).
 
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

(Order granting Motion to Dismiss and denying Motion to Strike; pleading recovery of money/property under FRBP 7001(1), objection to discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(c), and nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(14)); signed July 11, 2014, entered July 14, 2014 (Doc. No. 13).
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION
 

(Order denying Hope's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; pleading 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2); collateral estoppel does not preclude bankruptcy court from exercising exclusive jurisdiction to determine nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)); signed July 11, 2014, entered July 14, 2014 (Doc. No. 15).
 
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that judicial estoppel not appropriate to preclude the Court from considering relevant facts hereto unknown to the Plaintiff and that, in light thereof, the Plaintiff otherwise failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact, which would overcome the Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

Honorable James R. Sacca

Following trial, the Court concluded that: (1) the Debtor would not be denied a discharge under 11 U.S.C. §727(a)(4)(A) for committing a false oath because she had no fraudulent intent when misstating facts related to receiving certain settlement proceeds; (2) the Debtor’s debt to her landlord would not be deemed nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A) because, although she broke a promise to pay her rent arrearage out of her settlement proceeds, she intended to pay him when she made the promise and thus had no fraudulent intent; (3) the landlord failed to carry his burden in proving that the Debtor caused certain willful or malicious damage to his property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6); and (4) the Debtor was not entitled to a grant of attorneys’ fees under 11 U.S.C. §523(d) because the landlord had a reasonable basis for his claims.

Honorable Mary Grace Diehl (Recall)

The Chapter 7 Trustee’s motion for default judgment as to Defendant Andrew Walcott was denied because there were not sufficient facts to warrant an award of judgment.  Trustee sought judgment as to a willful violation of the stay and there were insufficient facts to even make out a violation of the stay, let alone the required intent element.  Specifically, the amended complaint did not allege facts specific to conclude or infer that Defendant Walcott had knowledge of the bankruptcy filing.  Trustee made a general allegation of a conspiracy but failed to plead any facts, including circumstantial evidence, in support of the allegation.  Additionally, the conspiracy allegation was a legal conclusion not entitled to conclusive weight under the applicable Federal Rules and the Supreme Courts’ Iqubal/Twombly pleading standard.  The Court also determined that Defendant’s late filed answer, which included a crosslcaim, had no legal effect since the answer itself was procedurally improper and a crossclaim must be asserted in a pleading as provided by Rule 13(g).
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment with respect to its amended complaint for nondischargeability of a credit card debt under Section 523(a)(2).  Plaintiff’s amended complaint did not warrant an award of judgment in its favor because it did not plead sufficient facts to show that the presumption of nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(2)(c) for luxury goods applied.  Further, judgment was not warranted under Section 523(a)(2)(A) because Plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts showing intent to deceive or fraud by Defendant.
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Honorable Paul W. Bonapfel

The fact that the chapter 7 debtor is not entitled to a discharge in a case filed in 2005 because of the receipt of a chapter 7 discharge in an earlier case filed in 2004 does not result in dismissal of the current case or eliminate the need to sell property and administer the case.  Creditors are entitled to be paid,  if possible, from the liquidation of assets, and the debtor has an interest in the liquidation of assets, where feasible, to reduce her debt burden and realize the value of her exemption.

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