O.C.G.A. 53-12-1 et. seq.; Defendant Gibson’s assertion that he, as a non-attorney trustee, can represent the defendant trusts in this litigation is denied. Defendant recognizes that business trusts must be represented by an attorney licensed to practice in this Court, but argues that these defendant trusts are land trusts organized as such under Article 3 of the Georgia Trust Act and can be represented by a non-attorney trustee. Defendant’s reliance on the Georgia Trust Act is misplaced. Trusts created under Article 3 are like business trusts and require a licensed attorney to appear in court. His other legal arguments are also without merit. Defendant Gibson, as a non-lawyer, is permitted to represent himself individually, but may not represent any other entity in court.
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Judge Joyce Bihary (Retired)
Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 12(e); Defendant Gibson’s pro se motion for more definite statement is denied. Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s amended complaint contained only conclusory allegations and failed to provide facts enabling him to frame a responsive pleading. Plaintiff’s ten count complaint lays out the claims made and relief sought and is not so ambiguous or unintelligible that Defendant cannot frame a response. To the extent Defendant lacks information regarding the allegations in the complaint, he will have the opportunity to acquire such information through the discovery process.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(c), 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a) (6); Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s pro se answer is granted. Defendant failed to serve responses to Plaintiff’s discovery requests even after Plaintiff’s motion to compel was granted. Plaintiff was entitled to a default judgment declaring that Plaintiff’s Superior Court judgment is non-dischargeable.
( 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(h), 521(a)(1), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006, 1007, 1017); Debtor’s motion to reopen his case is denied as debtor failed to timely pay his filing fee installment, failed to file explanation of exigent circumstances and submit certification of completion of budget and credit counseling briefing, and failed to file required schedules and statement of financial affairs within 45 days after date of filing petition.
Pursuant to earlier Order of Court requiring debtor’s ex-wife to obtain pre-approval before seeking affirmative relief against debtor’s employer, she must supplement current motion to hold employer in contempt by providing certain specific information and affidavits.
(11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a), 523(a)(2), (c); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(a), 4007(c); O.C.G.A. §44-12-24); Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff was assignee of a state court consent judgment, entitling original plaintiff, among other things, to assert a right of action for fraudulent inducement to extend credit if defendant ever filed personal bankruptcy. Georgia law does not permit assignee to bring action arising from injuries to another based on fraud and no other evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation was produced. With regard to the objection to discharge, plaintiff’s complaint was time barred and facts do not support an exception to discharge.
Trustee’s motion for settlement and compromise is granted. Objecting creditor filed bankruptcy, and her claim belongs to her bankruptcy estate. The Chapter 7 Trustee of the objecting creditor's estate agrees with terms of settlement and compromise, U.S. Trustee does not oppose it, and settlement and compromise meet Justice Oaks II, Ltd factors.
(11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 726, 541(a)(1)); Debtor’s objection to employment of real estate agent overruled. Court is without authority to permit debtor to keep unencumbered home valued at $125,000 as Bankruptcy Code requires Chapter 7 Trustee to liquidate debtor’s property and pay creditors.
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Defendant did not dispute Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed material facts, but argued that Plaintiff’s judgment was “void” because venue had “vanished” in Fulton County. Plaintiff’s Fulton County Superior Court judgment, which was based on Defendant’s fraudulent conduct, meets the test for collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, under Georgia law, and Plaintiff’s judgment is determined to be non-dischargeable. Defendant had waived any argument concerning venue as he had not raised it at the earliest opportunity or appealed the superior court judgment
11 U.S.C. §§ 109(e); 101(41), (15). Chapter 13 Trustee filed motion to dismiss on grounds of ineligibility. Only an individual with regular income may be a debtor in a Chapter 13 case. Plain meaning of “foundation” as organization or institution is inconsistent with plain meaning of “individual” as single human being or natural person. Other sections of Bankruptcy Code and of creation of Chapter 13 relief support interpretation that foundation is ineligible to be Chapter 13 debtor. Trustee’s motion granted and case dismissed.